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Abstract
‘Risk’ has become a central theme in 21st-century policy thinking. The fact 
that individuals and families are vulnerable to a wide range of social, economic and 
other risks, and that collective action is needed to help reduce and manage these 
risks, has long been important in social democratic thinking. The aim of this paper 
is  to  show  how  an  improved  understanding  of  risk  can  contribute  to  the 
development of a modernised social democratic model.2
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Risk and Social Democracy
‘Risk’  and  uncertainty,  in  a  variety  of  forms,  have  become  increasingly 
salient features of life in the early years of this century.   Arguably, ‘risk’ will be a 
central idea of the early 21st century, just as ‘globalisation’ was the dominant idea 
of the 1990s.1
The  fact  that  individuals  and  families  are  vulnerable  to  a  wide  range  of 
social, economic and other risks - and that collective action is needed to help reduce 
and manage these risks - has long been an important theme in social-democratic 
thinking. Giddens (2002) p. 25 observes, 
the welfare state, whose development can be traced back to 
the Elizabethan poor laws in England, is essentially a risk 
management  system.  It  is  designed  to  protect  against 
hazards that were once treated as at the disposition of the 
gods - sickness, disablement, job loss and old age.
As social democratic ideas are reformulated in the new environment of the 
21st  century,  the  role  of  risk  and  social  responses  to  risk  will  need  to  be 
reconsidered. Social democracy is built on the idea that as members of a society, we 
have an obligation to look out for each other. We also have a legitimate expectation 
of help from society when we are in need of it. In an increasingly diverse society, 
this kind of social solidarity cannot be assumed to exist automatically. Instead, it 
must  be  asserted  through  political  choices,  by  which  governments  help  reduce, 
share and manage the risks we face. 
By contrast, the neoliberal alternative is based on the idea that individuals, 
households and businesses should manage all risks by themselves through market 
transactions. In practice, this means that most risk is borne by those least able to 
1 Of course, just as the ideas surrounding the notion of globalisation were developed in academic 
literature well before their popularisation, the increasing significance of risk was foreshadowed by 




Risk and the welfare state
The growing social salience of risk and uncertainty suggests the possibility 
of  a  more  general  reorientation  of  views  about  the  welfare  state,  its  role  and 
significance.  One way of approaching this reorientation is in terms of Barr’s (2001) 
distinction between the ‘Piggy Bank’ and ‘Robin Hood’ functions of the welfare state. 
In Barr’s terminology, the Robin Hood function refers to the redistribution of 
wealth (either in lump sums or as flows of transfer payments) from the ‘lifetime 
rich’ to the ‘lifetime poor’. In a society where endowments of physical wealth and 
earning capacity were equal, the Robin Hood function would be unnecessary. 
By contrast, the ‘Piggy Bank’ function of the state involves the smoothing of 
individual consumption over time and over a range of risky outcomes. This function 
would be relevant even in a society where lifetime incomes were equal. It is just as 
relevant, (perhaps more so) for those on middle incomes as for those lower down the 
scale. 
In  traditional  presentations  of  the  case  for  social  democracy,  these 
'smoothing' functions were commonly seen as peripheral. Advocates of a targeted 
welfare  system  saw  the  provision  of  services  to  households  that  could  afford  to 
provide for themselves as an undesirable side-effect of provision for the poor – in 
other  words,  'middle  class  welfare'.  On  the  other  hand,  advocates  of  universal 
provision saw provision of services to the middle class as politically necessary to 
build support for redistribution.
The welfare state as Piggy Bank
Traditionally, more attention has been focused on the Robin Hood function of 
the welfare state than its role as a Piggy Bank. Opponents of universalism have 
argued  that  ‘middle-class  welfare’  constitutes  wasteful  churning  and  leads  to  an 
excessively  large  state  that  nevertheless  does  a  poor  job  in  equalising  income. 3
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Supporters  argue  that  universal  programs  build  social  solidarity  and  cement 
support for the Robin Hood function, even among those who are net contributors. 
 Barr argues that both sides miss the point. Consumption-smoothing and 
risk-pooling are valuable in themselves, and the role of the state in these activities 
needs to be assessed independently of distributional issues.
In fact, there is a strong case that redistribution plays a vital role because it 
pools  risks  that  arise  within  individual  lifetimes.  In  other  words,  redistribution 
deals with the risk of being born into a poor family instead of a rich one, possessing 
the  wrong  type  of  job  skills  for  a  particular  labour  market,  or  living  through  a 
sustained  economic  downturn.  On  this  analysis,  the  primary  role  of  the  welfare 
state is managing risk, not redistributing income. 
Given the central role of risk, we need to ask why the government should be 
involved in risk management. Barr argues that information-related market failures 
provide  a  more  robust  case  for  government  intervention  than  do  the  traditional 
categories  of  market  failure  under  certainty  (imperfect  competition,  externality, 
natural monopoly and so on). 
Barr  focuses  on  adverse  selection,  moral  hazard  and  unquantifiable 
uncertainty as the key issues. Embarking on a systematic treatment of the main 
functions of the modern welfare state, assessed in terms of risk management, he 
examines unemployment insurance, pensions, health care and education, in each 
case  considering  the  option  of  private  provision  against  a  range  of  government 
interventions. 
Risk and the functions of the welfare state
The interpretation of the welfare state in terms of risk and uncertainty may 
be illustrated by considering some of its core functions. For some of these functions, 
such as various forms of social insurance, the risk management function has always 




For instance, the public provision of retirement income and of services like 
health  or  education  have  commonly  been  justified  with  reference  to  notions  of 
redistribution, public goods and the provision of basic needs. However, none of these 
arguments yields an immediate response to neoliberal criticisms that it would be 
better to redistribute money incomes, and then allow households or individuals to 
allocate their expenditure between health, education and other things as they see 
fit. 
But when the argument is flipped over and examined on the basis of risk, a 
much  stronger  case  for  intervention  emerges.  We  can  see  this  by  looking  at  the 
health  and  education  sectors,  where  the  risks  associated  with  health  care  and 
investment in education are compelling. 
Health
The problems with market provision of health care are well known. In the 
absence  of  public  intervention  or  insurance,  health  care  expenses  for  even 
moderately serious illnesses and injuries are so large and uncertain as to be beyond 
the  capacity  of  most  individuals  and  households  to  manage  through  ordinary 
methods such as drawing on savings. In the United States, for example, an average 
day  in  hospital  can  cost  $US1,500  (around  $AUD2,000).  Even  a  short  stay  in 
hospital can exhaust the liquid financial resources of the average household. 
The  usual  private  market  response  in  cases  of  this  kind  is  insurance. 
However, health insurance faces severe problems arising from the fact that some 
people  are  more  likely  to  suffer  poor  health  than  others.  If  insurers  have 
information on the health status of their clients, they will charge higher rates for 
those known to be at high risk, or even refuse to cover them at all. If clients can 
keep this information private, those at high risk will naturally be more willing to 
seek coverage, and this will push up rates across the board (the problem known as 
'adverse selection').
Despite strenuous attempts, no private market solution to this problem has 5
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been found. The US has maintained higher levels of reliance on private insurance 
than most other countries, but even so, almost 50 million people are uninsured. 
Many  more  are  covered  by  the  public  residual  insurance  schemes  Medicare  and 
Medicaid,  which  are  hugely  expensive.  In  fact,  despite  offering  coverage  to  only 
limited groups such as the elderly, military veterans and the very poor, the US 
government sector actually spends more on healthcare relative to GDP than most 
other OECD countries. Substantial reliance on public financing is inevitable.
The necessity of public financing may be traced to the risks associated with 
health in both the short term and long term. In the short term, we can't know for 
sure if or when we will get sick. In the long term, markets cannot manage the risk 
associated with the fact that some people will have chronically worse health than 
others. 
Education
Similar lifetime risks arise in education. On the one hand, as children start 
school,  or  as  teenagers  enter  university,  there  is  a  lot  of  uncertainty  about  the 
outcomes. Some will do well   and go on to high-paying jobs, while others will do 
poorly and face the prospect of insecure, badly paid work. But this uncertainty is 
not uniform. Students from wealthy backgrounds with highly educated parents face 
much better odds than those whose parents have low incomes and less education. 
As a result, any system relying primarily on private financing and provision 
of  education  is  likely  to  be  inefficient  and  inequitable.  Students  from  poor 
backgrounds will have limited access to loans to support education, and will face 
less favourable terms and more limited opportunities.
Inequality of access can be seen quite clearly when we look at the make up of 
student populations in the top US universities. A 2004 study showed that, of the 
146  most  competitive  and  selective  institutions,  just  3  percent  of  students  come 
from families whose incomes are in the lowest 25 percent. In comparison, 74 percent 
came from families in the top quarter. Although inequality of access is less marked 6
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in Australia, students from working class background are less than half as likely to 
attend university as students from professional and managerial backgrounds. These 
unequal opportunities are partly due to problems at the school level, but they also 
reflect inadequate responses to the risks associated with education.
A related problem is that external assessment of the quality of education is 
difficult. If a school or university reduces the quality of the education it provides, for 
example  by  offering  less  demanding  content,  it  will  be  many  years  before  this 
becomes apparent. As a result, competitive market mechanisms do not work well in 
the education sector, if indeed they work at all. 
 Reframing inequality in the context of risk
The issue of the distribution and redistribution of income has long been a 
central concern of democratic political systems. In the 20th century, particularly 
on the Left, the issue of income distribution was viewed primarily in terms of 
economic and social class, usually with a focus on the organised working class. 
As  class  boundaries  have  blurred  and  unions  have  declined  in  power  and 
influence,  the  effectiveness  of  class-based  arguments  for  redistribution  have 
declined. 
One  result  has  been  a  rethinking  of  the  more  abstract  arguments  for 
egalitarianism, such those derived from utilitarianism and from the theory of 
justice developed by Rawls (1971). A striking feature of this new thinking is that 
it frames inequality in the context of the risk associated with a hypothetical 
process of social planning or contracting, a process in which no one can be sure 
what place they will fill in society.
One way to think about these abstract defences of egalitarian redistribution 
is as generalisations of the risk-based case for the welfare state. In a risk-based 
view, redistribution may be seen as providing insurance against a particular kind of 7
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risk, namely the risk of being born poor, socially dislocated and without access to 
human and social capital. 
The point is that people’s lifetime incomes are inevitably affected by their 
family backgrounds. Children from dysfunctional families do face greater risks of 
unemployment,  poverty  and  so  on  than  those  from  stable,  socially  integrated 
families. 
There  is  no  inevitability  about  this  relationship.  People  from  poor  and 
unstable family backgrounds can prosper, and those with a more favourable start in 
life may fail. From a risk perspective, however, the fact that everyone has a chance 
does not alter the fundamental injustice of a society where people face radically 
different life chances. 
The problem of unequal life chances has commonly been framed in terms of a 
contrast between equality of opportunity and equality of outcome. In this framing,   
equality of opportunity is the idea that everyone should have an equal chance at the 
prizes society has to offer, regardless of family background. Equality of opportunity 
is distinguished from equality of outcome, that is, the idea that society should not 
be divided into groups of winners and losers, even if the contest for those positions 
is in some sense fair.
In reality, though, no such distinction is sustainable in the long run. What 
without active intervention, inequality is inherently accumulative in nature. In a 
society with highly unequal outcomes, those who do well in an initially equal race 
will have the resources to ensure a head start for their children, in the form of 
private schooling, capital for business investment, richer social networks and so on. 
Hence,  equal  opportunity  cannot  be  sustained  for  long  in  the  presence  of  highly 
unequal outcomes. 
This point is illustrated by the experience of the United States. In the 19th 
century the United States genuinely was a land of opportunity, with rates of social 
mobility far greater than those in Europe. By the late 20th century, Americans born 8
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into low-income families were less likely to escape poverty than their counterparts 
in other developed countries (Goodin et al 1999).
Government as the ultimate risk manager
The  past  is  inevitably  viewed  through  the  prism  of  the  present  and  the 
imagined future. Just as happened with globalisation a decade ago, it is necessary 
to reassess the experience of the 19th and 20th centuries in the light of new ways of 
thinking about the present. 
Moss (2002) surveys two centuries of American history, in which he presents 
the state as ‘the ultimate risk manager’. Moss distinguishes three phases of public 
risk management in the United States. Although the United States is atypical in 
important  respects,  Moss’s  three-phase  model  provides  a  useful  framework  for 
discussion.
Moss’  first  phase,  ‘security  for  business’,  encompasses  innovations  such  as 
limited liability and bankruptcy laws, introduced in the period before 1900. The 
institutions of bankruptcy and limited liability have been established for so long 
now that they seem like a natural part of the capitalist order of things. Yet, as Moss 
shows, before their introduction they were vigorously opposed by defenders of the 
free  market,  who  saw  them  as  undermining  the  principle  of  individual 
responsibility and promoting what is now called moral hazard. 
Moss’s second phase, ‘security for workers,’ was produced by the shift from an 
economy  dominated  by  agricultural  smallholdings  to  a  manufacturing-based 
economy in which most households depended on wage employment. In this phase, 
workers  received  systematic  protection  from  the  impact  of  industrial  accidents, 
through workers’ compensation, and from the risk of unemployment, the natural 
counterpart  of  wage  employment.  Historically  the  phase  includes  Progressive 9
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initiatives such as workers’ compensation and the core programs of the New Deal 
like unemployment insurance and social security. 
These developments were less extensive in the United States than in most 
other  developed  countries.  Although  European  countries  developed  welfare  state   
protections  for  workers  further,  it  is  arguable  that  Australia,  with  its  “wage-
earners’  welfare  state”  (Castles  1994)  fits  Moss’  model  even  better,  since  a  wide 
range of benefits were conditioned on employment status.
The third phase, ‘security for all’, is still under way and includes such diverse 
initiatives  as  consumer  protection  laws,  environmental  protection  and  public 
disaster  relief.  These  may  be  seen  as  responses  to  the  ‘risk  society’.  Risks  of 
environmental  degradation  and  natural  disaster  are  inherently  social  in  their 
nature,  and  the  success  or  failure  of  a  society  in  responding  to  these  risks  is  a 
measure of the capacity and responsiveness of its government. Both the failure of 
Japanese authorities to respond adequately to the Kobe earthquake and the even 
more  catastrophic  failure  of  the  US  government  in  the  aftermath  of  Hurricane 
Katrina prompted fundamental questioning of the nature of social arrangements 
and the adequacy of social protection.
The great risk shift
In the last quarter of the 20th century, there was a strong reaction against 
the welfare state, associated with the movements variously known as 'Thatcherism' 
in the United Kingdom, 'Reaganism' in the United States, 'economic rationalism' in 
Australian and neoliberalism more generally. The neoliberal movement criticised 
the welfare state as a costly, inefficient and ultimately inequitable drag on economic 
performance.
One influential way of framing this critique was the claim that by socialising 10
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the risks faced by individuals and households, the welfare state necessarily reduced 
incentives to pursue risky opportunities. Hence, it was argued that reductions in 
welfare benefits would reduce welfare dependence and create a more enterprising 
society. This is far from obvious, particularly once we look beyond the sphere of for-
profit business enterprise. Social innovations of all kinds flourished in the 1960s, a 
time  of  full  employment  and  a  strong  welfare  state.  Fear  of  poverty  tends  to 
encourage conformity to existing social norms and established career paths rather 
than a willingness to experiment.
During the 1990s, it was widely argued that the transformations of economic 
and  social  structures  associated  with  the  increased  importance  of  risk  rendered 
social democracy obsolete. It would inevitably be replaced, it was argued, by the 
emergence  of  a  new  global  turbo-capitalism  (Luttwak  1999).  But  in  the  21st 
century, it seems that social democracy has proved more resilient than its critics 
expected, and than some of its supporters feared. In the English-speaking world, 
where  the  neoliberal  push  has  been  most  vigorous,  the  main  institutions  of  the 
welfare state, including public health, education and social security systems remain 
intact, despite continuous pressure for ‘reform’.
The persistence of the welfare state has surprised many observers, given the 
decline of many of the mass institutions that supported it (most obviously trade 
unions), and the emergence of an increasingly diverse and individualistic society. A 
focus on shared risk may help to explain this resilience. Many discussions of social 
democracy focus on notions of community that derive ultimately from membership 
of some specific group, and therefore appear vulnerable to social change that breaks 
down the boundaries between groups. 
By contrast, consideration of the risks we all face, and a view of society as a 
set  of  institutions  through  which  we  jointly  manage  those  risks,  may  have  less 
immediate emotional appeal than specific claims about community. But it can be 11
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supported by reasoned ethical judgements that are consistent with diversity and 
individualism. 
Neoliberalism affected not only the explicit institutions of the welfare state 
like  social  welfare  benefits,  but  also  the  implicit  contracts  between  workers  and 
employers,  under  which  employers  would  seek  to  preserve  jobs,  except  in 
circumstances where the viability of their business was threatened, and to reward 
the loyalty of long-term employees through the maintenance of career paths. From 
the 1980s onwards, businesses routinely dismissed employees in large numbers, not 
as a last resort, but as a preferred method of making already substantial profits 
even larger.
With the advantage of hindsight, it is evident that the transfer of risk from 
government  and  business  to  households  has  been  one  of  the  most  significant 
outcomes of the neoliberal era.  Hacker (2006)  describes this process as the ‘Great 
Risk Shift’. 
A particularly striking feature of this transfer has been the extent to which 
business  and  political  leaders  have  been  insulated  from  it.  Top  managers  are 
protected by increasingly generous ‘golden parachutes’, ensuring that even if they 
lose their jobs for poor performance they are still entitled to large payouts. Although 
this has been accompanied by the expanded use of devices like payment in share 
options, which appear to expose senior managers to risk, these are largely shams. 
Options that fail to deliver the expected benefits, because the price of the company 
concerned falls below expectations, are routinely repriced or reissued by company 
boards. Likewise politicians, so long as they have not offended business interests, 
can  expect  to  enhance  their  generous  superannuation  with  lucrative  jobs  in  the 
private sector, many of which appear so undemanding as to be virtual sinecures. 
Meanwhile, households are exposed to increasing levels of financial risk. The 
results are most evident in the United States, where bankruptcy has become more 
and more common. By 2005, more Americans experienced bankruptcy than divorce. 12
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A ‘reform’ introduced in that year made bankruptcy much harder, but this merely 
shifted  the  form  of  financial  distress.  Because  the  new  laws  made  it  harder  to 
refinance housing debt in bankruptcy, they contributed to a wave of foreclosures on 
‘sub-prime’ loans made to high risk borrowers. 
This  phenomenon  is  not  unique  to  the  US,  although  it  is  most  clearly 
developed. Rapid growth of household debt in a number of OECD countries implies 
increasing vulnerability to similar risks in the event of an economic downturn. Not 
surprisingly, there has been a resurgence of support for the traditional role of the 
state in protecting individuals and families from the risks of a market economy, 
particularly in relation to employment.
Moreover, the claims made on behalf of unfettered capitalism in the 1990s 
have increasingly come under question. The dot-com boom, ending in the crash of 
2000, cast doubt on the idea that the growth of an information-based economy was 
best directed by speculative investors. And it has become increasingly apparent that 
the  main  effect  of  neoliberal  reform  has  been  to  shift  risk  from  business  and 
governments to workers and consumers.
As a result, voters seem disinclined to abandon social democracy in practice. 
Conservative Australian Prime Minister John Howard observed, in the lead up to 
the 2004 Federal election that “There is a desire on the part of the community for 
an investment in infrastructure and human resources and I think there has been a 
shift in attitude in the community on this, even among the most ardent economic 
rationalists.” More recently, Howard has conceded the need for action on other risks 
such as climate change.
A new case for social democracy
The resilience of social democratic institutions and values in the face of a 
concerted neoliberal attack has been striking. It is not sufficient however to defend 
the existing institutions of the social-democratic welfare state. Rather the case for 




The  idea  that  we  have  the  capacity  to  share  and  manage  risks  more 
effectively  as  a  society  than  as  individuals  may  provide  the  basis  for  such  a 
reformulation. The set of policies traditionally associated with social democracy may 
be regarded as responses to a range of risks facing individuals, from health risks to 
uncertain life chances.
Equally importantly, an emphasis on facing and managing risk collectively, 
through  social  institutions  supported  by  government,  is  relevant  to  many  of  the 
challenges we will face in the future. Moss’s emphasis on the role of the state in 
providing protection against disasters looks particularly prescient in the light of the 
failure of the Bush Administration to provide a coherent response to the destruction 
of much of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina. The damaging effect of that failure 
on the credibility of the Bush Administration and on support for the Republican 
Party in general, has been large and durable.
An  even  bigger  source  of  risk  today  is  climate  change.  In  this  case,  the 
failure of neoliberals to respond has been complete. Until very recently, the vast 
majority of commentators on the political right (at least in the United States and 
most other English-speaking countries)   either ignored the problem or sought to 
discredit the scientific evidence that established its existence and severity. Even 
now that attempts to delude the public on the scientific facts have generally been 
abandoned, the Bush Administration and its allies have no coherent response to the 
problem.  
Finally,  there  is  the  question  of  national  security.  National  security  is 
traditionally seen as the trump card of political conservatives, yet neither historical 
nor  recent  experience  suggests  that  this  perception  is  strongly  based  in  reality. 
Rather than treating security against foreign enemies or terrorist attacks as one of 
the risks faced by our community, to be minimised as far as possible and managed 
like  other  risks,  the  conservative  approach  has  been  to  treat  such  risks  as 14
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existential threats to the nation and to respond with military force, even though 
this  is  usually  not  the  best  response  and  commonly  a  counterproductive  choice. 
From a social-democratic perspective, the nation-state is not an end in itself, but a 
set of institutions designed to serve the collective interests of its members. This 
view of the state suggests a more realistic approach to national security, based on 
careful assessments of costs and benefits, in contrast to outdated militarism.
Treating  national  security  as  a  problem  of  risk  management  has  two  big 
benefits.  First,  it  means  that  the  security  implications  of  global  risks  such  as 
climate change and financial instability can be taken into account as an inherent 
part of the process of policy formation, rather than as an afterthought. Second, it 
ensures that the use of military power is considered as one of a number of policy 
options, rather than being the default response to particular risks.
The  time  is  ripe,  then,  for  a  shift  from  the  defensive  position  of  the  last 
quarter-century,  in  which  social  democrats  struggled  mainly  to  protect  the 
achievements of the past. The risks and uncertainties we all face, from economic 
insecurity to climate change, require a response from society as a whole. At present, 
individuals are carrying the burden of risks that can only be faced by society as a 
whole,  while  society  is  bearing  the  costs  of  our  failure  to  enable  individuals  to 
manage the increased risks to which they have been exposed. 
We can reduce anxiety and suffering for individuals, and put our economy 
and society back on a sustainable footing by putting a coherent, consistent approach 
to risk management at the centre of public policy. Acting together, we can reduce 
and manage risk for everyone, and protect those who suffer the adverse outcomes of 
the risks that are an inevitable part of modern life.
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